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The nginx-side bypass added for raw downloads answered 403 to any user
agent outside the allowlist, which also broke cgit's "plain" link for
browsers, and it put bot policy in two places (an nginx location plus
the Anubis policy).
Serve /plain/ through Anubis like everything else and let the policy
allow it: %anubis-challenge-all-policy now has a `plain-download-tools'
rule (CEL, since user_agent_regex and path_regex cannot be combined)
that ALLOWs curl/wget on /<repo>/plain/ when the request carries no
Sec-Fetch-* header. Tools fetch raw files and cannot solve a
proof-of-work challenge; browsers do send Sec-Fetch-*, so they still get
the challenge -- and can solve it, so the plain link works again. A
browser claiming a curl user agent is challenged too.
Header names in the expression must be in canonical Go form
(Sec-Fetch-Mode): the X-Forwarded-For style lookup is case-sensitive.
Drops the plain-anubis-bypass? and plain-user-agents fields, the
cgit-plain-location, and the now unused nginx-map serializer. Tests
t23-t26 cover the policy: curl/wget are served, browsers and spoofed
curl user agents are challenged (the latter two are Anubis-only, like
t17/t18).
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Every limit was keyed on $binary_remote_addr, but the deployment
terminates TLS on the host and forwards from 127.0.0.1 without
X-Forwarded-For, so the four limits collapsed into one bucket shared by
the whole internet: 5 r/s, 20 connections and 60 r/min for
/log|/commit|/diff for everybody. Ordinary browsing got 429s (9 of 12
requests at one request every two seconds), and `git clone' failed on
its first request.
Recover the client address instead: new trusted-proxies and
real-ip-header fields feed set_real_ip_from/real_ip_header/
real_ip_recursive, emitted by the new cgit-http-directives (the OS
passes it as nginx extra-content; %cgit-rate-limit-http-directives is
kept as the default-config value). The trusted-proxies default of
127.0.0.1 matches the host proxy, and set to '() when an instance is
exposed directly so a client cannot pick its own bucket.
Also for anonymous reads:
* the expensive zone goes from 5r/m burst 3 to 60r/m burst 20 -- one
request per second per client still stops history walks but leaves
log -> commit -> diff chains alone;
* /plain/ (raw file content: curl, wget, scripts) can skip the Anubis
challenge (plain-anubis-bypass?), which a tool cannot solve, and can
be restricted to user-agent prefixes (plain-user-agents) so it cannot
be used from a browser;
* internal-listen makes the Anubis-mode internal cgit address
configurable, since a --network container shares the host netns and
port 8081 may be taken.
The container uses nginx-realip (guix-bioinformatics, gn packages web):
the stock nginx is built without the real_ip module and refuses the
directives with `unknown directive "set_real_ip_from"'.
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Introduce a general per-client-IP rate limit on the public cgit
listener: 5 requests/second with burst 30 through limit_req
zone=perip, plus at most 20 concurrent connections per IP through
limit_conn connperip. Both answer 429 Too Many Requests and log at
warn level (limit_req_log_level/limit_conn_log_level) for fail2ban.
The existing, stricter limit on the expensive endpoints (/diff/,
/commit/, /log/) is kept. A bot that keeps one connection open is
not caught by the connection cap, so limit_req is the one that
matters most.
Serve the container on plain port 80 (we only use port 80). A
container shares the host network namespace from a child user
namespace, so its root has no CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE over that
namespace and nginx cannot bind port 80; lower
net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start in the sysctl no-op service
instead. Run nginx at warn log level so the rejection lines actually
reach /var/log/nginx/error.log.
Add nginx serializers for the limit_conn* and limit_*_log_level
directives, and a t20 regression test. Update the port-80 defaults
in the test scripts.
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Add the same Anubis front-end the other containers run to the
gn-guile branding webserver:
* services/anubis.scm: cgit's anubis-configuration,
anubis-activation, anubis-shepherd-service, anubis-service-type
and %anubis-unix-socket move here from cgit.scm, so any front-end
can instantiate the service without importing the cgit module.
The record keeps the challenge-all policy and difficulty-4
defaults.
* services/cgit.scm: import the moved names from the shared module;
no behavior change.
* containers/gn-guile-webserver-container.scm: the guile webserver
moves to the internal port 8092; the public port 8091 is the
stock nginx-service-type proxying everything through Anubis
(typed proxy headers via (genenetwork services nginx)), which
challenges every client and forwards verified requests to the
guile server. The system's shepherd is the self-pipe variant
(shepherd-for-containers), required by the stock nginx service.
Verified live: curl and browser user agents get the challenge on
8091; the guile server serves the aging site on 8092; Anubis runs
the challenge-all policy at difficulty 4 with target
http://127.0.0.1:8092; nginx-init completes (the patched shepherd
works); ssh on 2225. All four containers rebuild.
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Bring the challenge-all policy and the difficulty knob to every
containerized front-end, via a shared module:
* services/anubis.scm: new shared module -- %anubis-challenge-all-policy
(challenge every client that reaches Anubis; browsers solve the
proof-of-work and get a cookie, every other client stays blocked;
Anubis's built-in default passes non-browser user agents through
unchallenged) and anubis-command, building the full Anubis
command line (bind socket, policy file, difficulty, target and
any extra arguments such as -cookie-secure=false) for splicing
into the shepherd gexp.
* services/cgit.scm: use the shared policy and anubis-command.
* services/genecup.scm: genecup-nginx-configuration gains
anubis-policy (default: challenge-all) and anubis-difficulty
(default 4); the bundled Anubis shepherd passes them through.
* services/bnw.scm: anubis-configuration and bnw-nginx-configuration
gain the same policy and difficulty fields. The GeneNetwork
workflow endpoints and /bnw-data/ never reach Anubis (nginx
serves them directly), so GN2's server-to-server calls keep
working for non-browser clients.
* test/genecup_smoke.py: BASE configurable via the environment,
so the content suite can run against the internal listener of an
anubis-enabled deployment.
Fixes two bugs found during live testing: the policy YAML was
double-escaped (the catchall user-agent regex matched literal
backslash-quote sequences and never fired, letting everything
through), and the first splice of anubis-command passed its
elements to append as bare arguments.
Verified live: GeneCup -- challenge for curl and browser user
agents on 4201, internal listener serves the app, smoke suite
11/11 against the internal listener; cgit -- challenge on 8883,
git clone stays direct, internal content + rate limiting (429)
work, policy file and difficulty 4 logged; BNW -- challenge on
8881, bn_genenet.php and /bnw-data/ stay direct (GN2 keeps
working), /version.php is challenged, policy file and difficulty 4
logged. Note: BNW's /version.php deployment-validation endpoint
is now behind the challenge -- check it from a browser, the
internal listener, or exempt it alongside the workflow endpoints.
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anubis-configuration: new 'difficulty' field (integer, default 4,
matching the Anubis binary), passed to the shepherd service via
-difficulty. Each increment doubles the compute a client must burn
to solve the challenge before it gets a week-long cookie; raise it
when headless browsers start solving their way through the
challenge-all policy (10-12 costs a real browser a few seconds once
a week and bots an infeasible amount per IP).
Verified live in the container (anubis-enabled, TEMP internal port
8085 on this test host): Anubis logs difficulty 4, the challenge is
served, git clone stays direct. The flag was also verified
standalone (-difficulty 12 accepted and logged by the binary).
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git.genenetwork.org must not serve any client that cannot solve a
challenge -- only the git clone endpoints keep working for
non-browser clients:
* services/cgit.scm (%anubis-challenge-all-policy): new Anubis
policy document -- deny the embedded pathological-scraper and
aggressive-AI-bot rules outright, then CHALLENGE everything else.
Anubis's built-in default policy, by contrast, passes non-browser
user agents (curl, wget, feed readers) through unchallenged --
they carry zero request weight in its threshold system.
* anubis-configuration: new 'policy' field (YAML file-like,
defaulting to the challenge-all policy; #f selects Anubis's
built-in default). The shepherd service passes it via
-policy-fname.
* The git smart-HTTP endpoints (info/refs, git-upload-pack,
git-receive-pack) never reach Anubis -- nginx serves them
directly -- so git clone/ls-remote/push keep working for every
client. Note cgit atom feeds and tarball snapshot downloads DO
go through the challenge now.
* test/cgit_http_tests.py (t18): non-browser user agents are
challenged too; t17/t18 apply to anubis-enabled deployments.
Verified live in the container (anubis-enabled, TEMP internal
port 8085 since a foreign process squats 8081 on this test host):
curl and browser user agents both get the challenge through the
public port; git ls-remote and a full git clone work directly
through the public port; the internal listener serves cgit
content; rate limiting still answers 429 after the burst; Anubis
logs loading the policy from the store. The policy was also
verified standalone against the binary (challenge for curl/
browser/wget UAs vs. pass-through under the built-in default).
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nginx-service-type
Complete the repository-wide removal of hand-built nginx
directives (proxy_set_header and friends were still plain strings):
* services/nginx.scm: new shared module with typed serializers --
<fastcgi-parameter> and <proxy-header> records (name/value, like
the environment-variable records of the standard fcgiwrap service)
serialized by fastcgi-parameter->nginx / proxy-header->nginx with
proper quoting, plus fastcgi-pass, proxy-pass,
nginx-unix-socket-url, unix-socket-proxy-pass, try-files,
nginx-include, limit-request, limit-request-status,
limit-request-zone and client-max-body-size procedures. No nginx
directive is built by hand anywhere anymore; values come from
configuration fields, and quoting handles empty values
(httpoxy), spaces in paths and nginx variables alike.
* services/cgit.scm: use the shared module for everything -- the
Anubis proxy location (unix-socket-proxy-pass + proxy-header
records), the rate-limiting directives (limit-request-zone /
limit-request / limit-request-status from %cgit-expensive-*), the
try_files fallbacks and the fastcgi_params includes.
* services/genecup.scm: replace the hand-rolled nginx.conf and the
custom foreground-nginx shepherd with the stock nginx-service-type
receiving nginx-server-configuration records (pure reverse proxy
in front of Flask; the Anubis variant's public/internal server
split included). The bundled Anubis shepherd service (with the
cookie-secure knob) stays; nginx accounts, activation and conf
rendering come from upstream now.
* containers/genecup-container.scm: instantiate nginx-service-type
(client_max_body_size via the typed serializer) and run PID 1
with shepherd-for-containers.
* packages.scm: new shared module with shepherd-for-containers
(the signalfd->self-pipe patch), moved out of cgit-container.scm
so all containers can use it.
Verified live: cgit suite 18/19 (t17 Anubis challenge not
applicable in the plain-variant test deployment), including git
clone/ls-remote/snapshot and the rate-limit test; genecup smoke
suite 11/11 with the Anubis challenge verified for browser user
agents, through the records-rendered confs. bnw.scm still carries
the old hand-rolled nginx.conf and is next.
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Replace the remaining hand-written fastcgi_param directive strings
in the location bodies with typed configuration, as with the
standard services:
* services/cgit.scm (<fastcgi-parameter>): new name/value record,
like the environment-variable records of the standard fcgiwrap
service; fastcgi-parameter->nginx serializes it into a
fastcgi_param directive, quoting string values (so the empty
httpoxy-mitigation value and repository paths with spaces work,
and nginx variables such as $uri keep expanding) and splicing
file-like values as unquoted store paths. fastcgi-pass
serializes the fastcgi_pass directive from the socket.
* The parameters every FastCGI program expects (QUERY_STRING,
REQUEST_METHOD, CONTENT_TYPE, REMOTE_ADDR, ...) are no longer
listed by hand: they come from the standard fastcgi_params file
the nginx service installs into /etc/nginx, included the
standard way.
* cgit-web-configuration: new 'socket' parameter replaces the
hard-coded %cgit-fcgiwrap-socket constant; used by the
activation (socket directory ownership), the fcgiwrap shepherd
service and the fastcgi_pass directives.
Verified live (anubis? #f test deployment): nginx-init completes,
suite 18/19 (t17 Anubis challenge not applicable in the plain
variant), including git clone/ls-remote/snapshot/about-filter
through the CGI; both anubis variants pass nginx -t with the
fastcgi_params include resolving against /etc/nginx.
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Replace the hand-rolled nginx.conf string builder and the custom
foreground-nginx shepherd service with upstream machinery, as
requested upstream:
* services/cgit.scm: drop cgit-nginx-conf-file (string concatenation)
and the nginx shepherd/activation/accounts services. The cgit
sites are now nginx-server-configuration records (locations as
nginx-location-configuration / nginx-named-location-configuration)
contributed to the stock nginx-service-type via a service extension;
the rate-limit zone travels as %cgit-rate-limit-http-directives
(http-context extra-content of the OS's nginx-configuration). The
fcgiwrap shepherd service stays (the stock fcgiwrap-service-type
cannot pass CGIT_CONFIG or a worker count).
* containers/cgit-container.scm: instantiate nginx-service-type;
shepherd/container-signals: patch shepherd 1.0.9 to prefer its
self-pipe signal mechanism (SHEPHERD_DISABLE_SIGNALFD) and run it
as PID 1 via the essential-services shepherd-configuration. In
this daemon's nested-container sandbox the signalfd wake-up never
fires, so every start method that waits for a child's exit status
(the stock nginx 'nginx -t' one-shot, invoke-based starts) blocks
forever; the self-pipe fallback works. Tests are disabled for the
patched build (the upstream suite does not survive the build
sandbox); the container's own suite covers the deployment.
* services/container-ssh.scm: keep /var/empty root-owned/read-only in
activation -- the stock nginx-service-type gives its system user
/var/empty as the home directory and on a minimal container that
would break sshd's privilege separation.
Verified live (anubis? #f test deployment): stock nginx shepherd
starts (nginx-init + nginx), suite 18/19 (t17 Anubis challenge not
applicable in the plain-variant test deployment), including t19
rate limiting through the records-rendered conf. The anubis? #t
conf (public/internal server split) verified statically through the
service-extension machinery and by nginx -t on the rendered file.
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Crawlers (including ones that pass the Anubis challenge) hammer the
history-walking cgit endpoints. Add nginx limit_req protection:
* services/cgit.scm (cgit-expensive-location, cgit-expensive-locations):
new helpers rendering the three rate-limited location blocks;
%cgit-expensive-rate 5r/m, %cgit-expensive-burst 3 (nodelay), status
429, shared zone cgit-expensive (10m, keyed on binary_remote_addr).
* The blocks sit before the generic @cgit fallback in both variants:
the plain server and the Anubis-internal server (127.0.0.1:8081), so
challenge-passing clients are limited too while the public Anubis
proxy itself stays unlimited.
* Export cgit-nginx-conf-file for deployment-validation tooling.
* test/cgit_http_tests.py (t19): rapid-fire /demo/log must exhaust the
burst (429) while the index page stays reachable; runs last so its
budget consumption cannot affect the single-hit tests.
Verified live on the container (anubis? #f test deployment): 4 rapid
requests pass (1+burst), the 5th returns 429, single requests after a
refill window pass, cheap endpoints unaffected; suite 18/19 (t17 Anubis
challenge N/A in the plain-variant test deployment).
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