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authorPjotr Prins <pjotr.public01@thebird.nl>2026-11-14 14:20:54 +0000
committerPjotr Prins <pjotr.public01@thebird.nl>2026-11-14 14:20:54 +0000
commit586b0f63ef31fde987e00a305e91ee4e2136332e (patch)
tree47eea9436d52d4634023b053f99049fa3ff21f39 /src/routes/dev.rs
parentc822ba22ce00c1615bf47fc8a13f28590aba424a (diff)
downloadgenenetwork4-586b0f63ef31fde987e00a305e91ee4e2136332e.tar.gz
tokens: short opaque API tokens in a single tokens.sqlite
A second credential format beside gn-auth's JWT, for agents and scripts:
`gn4ai_` + 56 body characters + 2 checksum characters = 64, from an
alphabet with no look-alikes, so a typo is refused before the registry is
consulted. Opaque by design -- nothing is stored in the token; every fact
lives in one SQLite database (`tokens.sqlite`, GN4_API_TOKENS_DB, mode
0600, gitignored) keyed by the SHA-256 of the secret. Revoking is a row,
takes effect on the next request, and a token in a log line reveals
nothing; lose the registry and every short token stops working.

Administration is local-only: GET/POST /tokens, DELETE /tokens/{id} and
GET /tokens/who are behind a router layer that refuses any caller whose
TCP peer is not 127.x.x.x/::1, and any request claiming to come through a
proxy. A layer rather than a per-handler check, so nothing of a remote
request is parsed before it is refused; there is no configuration switch,
because minting credentials must never be reachable from the network.

A short token reads public data only: every token-only endpoint, and
`#[gnauth(secured)]` endpoints for public rows; a confidential dataset is
refused with a 403 that names the JWT route, since gn-auth cannot validate
an opaque token (the on-the-fly-bridge and registry-grant alternatives
were both rejected for v1).

scripts/gn4-token.py create|list|revoke|who drives the routes, so there is
one implementation of the format and the revocation rules; the token is
printed exactly once.

Tests: the localhost guard over all four routes (remote peer, no peer,
proxied header), and mint -> authenticate -> who -> revoke -> 401.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/routes/dev.rs')
-rw-r--r--src/routes/dev.rs4
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/routes/dev.rs b/src/routes/dev.rs
index 58f50c2..ef87986 100644
--- a/src/routes/dev.rs
+++ b/src/routes/dev.rs
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ struct TokenResponse {
 /// Whether the connection's peer is this machine: an address in
 /// 127.0.0.0/8 (127.0.x.x), the IPv6 loopback `::1`, or an IPv4-mapped
 /// 127.x.
-fn is_local(peer: &SocketAddr) -> bool {
+pub(crate) fn is_local(peer: &SocketAddr) -> bool {
     match peer.ip() {
         IpAddr::V4(ip) => ip.is_loopback(),
         IpAddr::V6(ip) => {
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ fn is_local(peer: &SocketAddr) -> bool {
 /// these headers to anything, so they are never trusted to *establish*
 /// that a caller is local -- only used to refuse a request that claims to
 /// have come through a proxy.
-fn via_proxy(headers: &HeaderMap) -> bool {
+pub(crate) fn via_proxy(headers: &HeaderMap) -> bool {
     ["x-forwarded-for", "forwarded", "x-real-ip"]
         .into_iter()
         .any(|name| headers.contains_key(name))