From 586b0f63ef31fde987e00a305e91ee4e2136332e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pjotr Prins Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2026 14:20:54 +0000 Subject: tokens: short opaque API tokens in a single tokens.sqlite A second credential format beside gn-auth's JWT, for agents and scripts: `gn4ai_` + 56 body characters + 2 checksum characters = 64, from an alphabet with no look-alikes, so a typo is refused before the registry is consulted. Opaque by design -- nothing is stored in the token; every fact lives in one SQLite database (`tokens.sqlite`, GN4_API_TOKENS_DB, mode 0600, gitignored) keyed by the SHA-256 of the secret. Revoking is a row, takes effect on the next request, and a token in a log line reveals nothing; lose the registry and every short token stops working. Administration is local-only: GET/POST /tokens, DELETE /tokens/{id} and GET /tokens/who are behind a router layer that refuses any caller whose TCP peer is not 127.x.x.x/::1, and any request claiming to come through a proxy. A layer rather than a per-handler check, so nothing of a remote request is parsed before it is refused; there is no configuration switch, because minting credentials must never be reachable from the network. A short token reads public data only: every token-only endpoint, and `#[gnauth(secured)]` endpoints for public rows; a confidential dataset is refused with a 403 that names the JWT route, since gn-auth cannot validate an opaque token (the on-the-fly-bridge and registry-grant alternatives were both rejected for v1). scripts/gn4-token.py create|list|revoke|who drives the routes, so there is one implementation of the format and the revocation rules; the token is printed exactly once. Tests: the localhost guard over all four routes (remote peer, no peer, proxied header), and mint -> authenticate -> who -> revoke -> 401. --- src/routes/dev.rs | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/routes/dev.rs') diff --git a/src/routes/dev.rs b/src/routes/dev.rs index 58f50c2..ef87986 100644 --- a/src/routes/dev.rs +++ b/src/routes/dev.rs @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ struct TokenResponse { /// Whether the connection's peer is this machine: an address in /// 127.0.0.0/8 (127.0.x.x), the IPv6 loopback `::1`, or an IPv4-mapped /// 127.x. -fn is_local(peer: &SocketAddr) -> bool { +pub(crate) fn is_local(peer: &SocketAddr) -> bool { match peer.ip() { IpAddr::V4(ip) => ip.is_loopback(), IpAddr::V6(ip) => { @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ fn is_local(peer: &SocketAddr) -> bool { /// these headers to anything, so they are never trusted to *establish* /// that a caller is local -- only used to refuse a request that claims to /// have come through a proxy. -fn via_proxy(headers: &HeaderMap) -> bool { +pub(crate) fn via_proxy(headers: &HeaderMap) -> bool { ["x-forwarded-for", "forwarded", "x-real-ip"] .into_iter() .any(|name| headers.contains_key(name)) -- cgit 1.4.1