about summary refs log tree commit diff
path: root/README.md
AgeCommit message (Collapse)Author
6 daysdaemon: make the log directory configurable (--log-dir / GUIX_CONTAINER_LOG_DIR) HEAD masterPjotr
/var/log/guix-containers was a #define, and the daemon read no environment variables at all, so a host whose /var/log is read-only -- or anyone running the daemon outside a system-wide install -- had no way to keep container boot output except to edit and rebuild the C. It is now a runtime value: the flag wins, then $GUIX_CONTAINER_LOG_DIR, then the old default, and all three uses (the mkdir, the .writable probe, the per-container <name>.log path) go through it. The chosen directory is named at startup ("container logs: DIR") before the privilege check, for two reasons: it is the first thing an operator needs when a container does not come up, and it makes the switch observable without root, which is how test/run.sh now checks it -- --log-dir and the env var each have to appear in that line, and an unknown option still has to print the usage. README: documents the flag and the variable, says which wins, and points ProtectSystem=strict users at --log-dir as the alternative to LogsDirectory=. Also generalises one line that said "uid=1000(wrk)" -- true of the author's box, misleading on anyone else's -- to "your own uid, e.g. uid=1000".
6 daysREADME: a worked example for service containers, and a licencePjotr
The README explained the protocol, the fingerprint, the privileges and the privilege boundary well; what it did not have was the sequence for the case people actually hit -- a container whose services the host then talks to. New section "Worked example: a service container other programs talk to": --network shares the host's network namespace so container services are at 127.0.0.1:PORT on the host (and why that is not the daemon's --port); build the launcher with `guix system container -d` + `guix build` before letting the daemon start it, because `guix system container` builds *and* runs in the foreground; and the trap that bit during a real test -- a `--share` whose host path does not exist is dropped silently, so create it first. Plus the two timings worth having: a container is at its services ~2 s after START when the store paths are built, ~45 s on first boot while activation generates keys and lays out spool directories, so a client that gives up after a few seconds is measuring the wrong case. Boot output is where to look: LOG/--log, or /var/log/guix-containers/<pid>.log subject to the unit's LogsDirectory. LICENSE is now BSD 3-Clause (Copyright (c) 2026 Pjotr Prins), the same text as ai-memory's, and the README ends with a pointer to it.
2026-10-19daemon: refuse to start without CAP_SETUID/CAP_SYS_ADMIN; check log dirPjotr
Started as a normal user the daemon happily answered "OK <pid>" to every START and then forked a launcher that died within milliseconds (EPERM writing /proc/PID/uid_map), leaving the client with an empty LIST and, because /var/log was not writable either, no log to explain it. Check privileges at startup instead of warning: euid must be 0 and CapEff must carry CAP_SETUID (the 65536-entry uid map of the container's user namespace) and CAP_SYS_ADMIN (mounting its file systems, /proc and /dev); exit 1 with an error naming the missing piece -- this also catches root under a narrowed CapabilityBoundingSet=. Container boot output goes to /var/log/guix-containers: warn when that directory cannot be created or written (read-only /var, hardened unit) so the missing log is noticed at start-up rather than while debugging a failed boot. The hardened systemd example in the README was the cause of exactly that -- ProtectSystem=strict makes /var read-only -- so it now sets LogsDirectory=guix-containers, and a new "Privileges required" section documents the requirement. test/test.c gains test_privileges() (CapEff parse, root/non-root verdict); ./test/run.sh still passes.
2026-09-28doc: why the privileged daemon exists, plus the rootless alternativePjotr
Document the privilege boundary that motivates the daemon (guix system container needs real root: namespaces, CAP_NET_ADMIN, root shepherd; AppArmor fixes do not change that) and the verified rootless fallback: guix shell -C works from an unprivileged account when user namespaces are allowed and an explicit writable profile path is used (-p); no shepherd/sshd/guix-system services inside, but foreground daemons (nginx/php-fpm/octave) run fine for smoke tests. Also note the unprivileged guix-daemon (builds only), rootless Podman and PRoot alternatives.
2026-09-27doc: list the BNW container and VM deploymentsPjotr
2026-09-27vms: move hello-vm.scm from services/ to vms/Pjotr
VM definitions are not services; give them their own directory. The ../etc key reference still resolves from vms/.
2026-09-27services: slim down the hello-vm package setPjotr
Replace (cons hello %base-packages) with an explicit minimal list: bash, coreutils, findutils, grep, sed, gawk, tar, gzip, shadow, procps, guile and hello. %base-packages would add ~400 binaries to /run/current-system/profile/bin (nano, man-db, sudo, the inetutils ftp/telnet, wget, pciutils, ...). The ssh tools still come in via the openssh service and 'herd' via the essential shepherd service; the (useless) guix service is deleted from %base-services like in the containers. Also fix a list-building bug: (cons* ... hello) makes hello the TAIL of the list, so use 'list'. Result: profile/bin has 185 binaries (was 394) and the image store holds 263 items (was 362). Verified: ssh login, hello, and 'herd status ssh-daemon' all work.
2026-09-27services: add hello-vm.scm, a self-contained VM imagePjotr
Unlike 'guix system container', which bind-mounts the WHOLE host /gnu/store read-only into the guest (hardcoded %store-mapping in gnu/system/linux-container.scm -- there is no supported way to mount a subset), a qcow2 disk image built with 'guix system image -t qcow2' contains only the closure of the system: the guest sees ~360 store items instead of the host's 51815 and no host file systems at all. The definition is the minimal hello+ssh OS with %qemu-static-networking (QEMU user-mode network stack) and a serial console on ttyS0. Host SSH keys are generated at first boot and persist in the writable image, so they need no pinning. Verified: booted under qemu-system-x86_64 (TCG), ssh on forwarded port 2223 works with etc/hello-container-key, 'hello' runs, and the guest /gnu/store lists 362 items.
2026-09-27List containersPjotr Prins
2026-09-26run-guix-system-container: KILL sends SIGKILLPjotr Prins
Containers that hang at boot (e.g. blocked on entropy) ignore SIGTERM; kill -9 them instead.
2026-09-26run-guix-system-container: run one container at a time, LIST commandPjotr Prins
* START is refused while a previously started container is still alive (ERR already running container <pid>) * new LIST command reports running containers, including those started by previous daemon instances (via a /proc scan), so they can be found and KILLed after a daemon restart * client: new --list option; README updated
2026-09-26run-guix-container: new toolPjotr Prins
A C daemon (run as root) that starts Guix system containers on request over a line-based network protocol, plus an unprivileged Ruby client. * START/KILL/LOG/FINGERPRINT protocol; one request per connection * strict validation of store items before exec (HASH-run-container name, guile shebang, container markers, immutable store file) * --fingerprint WORD identifies the daemon instance (random hash when unset); verified by clients and passed to containers in GUIX_CONTAINER_FINGERPRINT * on SIGINT/SIGTERM: SIGTERM all started containers, 10s timeout, then SIGKILL * container boot output appended to /var/log/guix-containers/ * unit tests for launcher and fingerprint logic