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diff --git a/.venv/lib/python3.12/site-packages/urllib3/util/ssl_match_hostname.py b/.venv/lib/python3.12/site-packages/urllib3/util/ssl_match_hostname.py
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+"""The match_hostname() function from Python 3.5, essential when using SSL."""
+
+# Note: This file is under the PSF license as the code comes from the python
+# stdlib. http://docs.python.org/3/license.html
+# It is modified to remove commonName support.
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+import re
+import typing
+from ipaddress import IPv4Address, IPv6Address
+
+if typing.TYPE_CHECKING:
+ from .ssl_ import _TYPE_PEER_CERT_RET_DICT
+
+__version__ = "3.5.0.1"
+
+
+class CertificateError(ValueError):
+ pass
+
+
+def _dnsname_match(
+ dn: typing.Any, hostname: str, max_wildcards: int = 1
+) -> typing.Match[str] | None | bool:
+ """Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
+
+ http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
+ """
+ pats = []
+ if not dn:
+ return False
+
+ # Ported from python3-syntax:
+ # leftmost, *remainder = dn.split(r'.')
+ parts = dn.split(r".")
+ leftmost = parts[0]
+ remainder = parts[1:]
+
+ wildcards = leftmost.count("*")
+ if wildcards > max_wildcards:
+ # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
+ # than one wildcard per fragment. A survey of established
+ # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
+ # reasonable choice.
+ raise CertificateError(
+ "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn)
+ )
+
+ # speed up common case w/o wildcards
+ if not wildcards:
+ return bool(dn.lower() == hostname.lower())
+
+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
+ # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
+ # the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
+ if leftmost == "*":
+ # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
+ # fragment.
+ pats.append("[^.]+")
+ elif leftmost.startswith("xn--") or hostname.startswith("xn--"):
+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
+ # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
+ # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
+ # U-label of an internationalized domain name.
+ pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
+ else:
+ # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
+ pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r"\*", "[^.]*"))
+
+ # add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
+ for frag in remainder:
+ pats.append(re.escape(frag))
+
+ pat = re.compile(r"\A" + r"\.".join(pats) + r"\Z", re.IGNORECASE)
+ return pat.match(hostname)
+
+
+def _ipaddress_match(ipname: str, host_ip: IPv4Address | IPv6Address) -> bool:
+ """Exact matching of IP addresses.
+
+ RFC 9110 section 4.3.5: "A reference identity of IP-ID contains the decoded
+ bytes of the IP address. An IP version 4 address is 4 octets, and an IP
+ version 6 address is 16 octets. [...] A reference identity of type IP-ID
+ matches if the address is identical to an iPAddress value of the
+ subjectAltName extension of the certificate."
+ """
+ # OpenSSL may add a trailing newline to a subjectAltName's IP address
+ # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
+ ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ipname.rstrip())
+ return bool(ip.packed == host_ip.packed)
+
+
+def match_hostname(
+ cert: _TYPE_PEER_CERT_RET_DICT | None,
+ hostname: str,
+ hostname_checks_common_name: bool = False,
+) -> None:
+ """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
+ SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*. RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
+ rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
+
+ CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
+ returns nothing.
+ """
+ if not cert:
+ raise ValueError(
+ "empty or no certificate, match_hostname needs a "
+ "SSL socket or SSL context with either "
+ "CERT_OPTIONAL or CERT_REQUIRED"
+ )
+ try:
+ # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
+ #
+ # The ipaddress module shipped with Python < 3.9 does not support
+ # scoped IPv6 addresses so we unconditionally strip the Zone IDs for
+ # now. Once we drop support for Python 3.9 we can remove this branch.
+ if "%" in hostname:
+ host_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname[: hostname.rfind("%")])
+ else:
+ host_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
+
+ except ValueError:
+ # Not an IP address (common case)
+ host_ip = None
+ dnsnames = []
+ san: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...] = cert.get("subjectAltName", ())
+ key: str
+ value: str
+ for key, value in san:
+ if key == "DNS":
+ if host_ip is None and _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
+ return
+ dnsnames.append(value)
+ elif key == "IP Address":
+ if host_ip is not None and _ipaddress_match(value, host_ip):
+ return
+ dnsnames.append(value)
+
+ # We only check 'commonName' if it's enabled and we're not verifying
+ # an IP address. IP addresses aren't valid within 'commonName'.
+ if hostname_checks_common_name and host_ip is None and not dnsnames:
+ for sub in cert.get("subject", ()):
+ for key, value in sub:
+ if key == "commonName":
+ if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
+ return
+ dnsnames.append(value)
+
+ if len(dnsnames) > 1:
+ raise CertificateError(
+ "hostname %r "
+ "doesn't match either of %s" % (hostname, ", ".join(map(repr, dnsnames)))
+ )
+ elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
+ raise CertificateError(f"hostname {hostname!r} doesn't match {dnsnames[0]!r}")
+ else:
+ raise CertificateError("no appropriate subjectAltName fields were found")