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path: root/src/auth.rs
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//! Verifying bearer tokens issued by gn-auth, and checking gn-auth
//! resource authorization for data that isn't public. See
//! docs/gn-auth.md for the mechanism this implements.
//!
//! Two independent things happen here, and most endpoints only need
//! the first:
//!
//! - **Token verification** ([`AuthToken`], an extractor): checks a
//!   bearer token's RS256 signature and standard time claims against
//!   gn-auth's JWKS (`GET /auth/public-jwks`), cached and refreshed
//!   periodically rather than fetched per request. Add `AuthToken` as
//!   a handler parameter to require a valid token; handlers that
//!   don't need one simply omit it -- this is what makes auth
//!   opt-in per route rather than a blanket gate.
//! - **Resource authorization** ([`authorise`]): for data that isn't
//!   public (see [`is_publicly_readable`], matching GeneNetwork2's own
//!   `public > 0 AND confidentiality < 1` convention), asks gn-auth
//!   whether this token's holder has a given privilege on a specific
//!   resource (`POST /auth/resource/authorisation`), caching the
//!   per-(user, resource) answer briefly so repeated requests for the
//!   same resource don't each cost a round trip to gn-auth.

use axum::extract::FromRequestParts;
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use axum::http::request::Parts;
use jsonwebtoken::{Algorithm, DecodingKey, Validation, decode};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Mutex, OnceLock};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};

use crate::config::Config;
use crate::error::ApiError;
use crate::response::RequestInfo;

/// The gn-auth privilege that means "can view this resource" -- the
/// one every gated route in this API checks so far (see
/// src/routes/datasets.rs, src/routes/traits.rs).
pub const VIEW_RESOURCE_PRIVILEGE: &str = "group:resource:view-resource";

fn unauthorized(detail: impl Into<String>) -> ApiError {
    ApiError::new(
        StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
        "invalid_token",
        "Invalid or missing token",
        detail.into(),
        "authentication",
    )
}

/// The response header naming who a request ran as: the token's `sub`.
///
/// Put here by [`crate::lib::tag_caller`] on every authenticated response
/// (the caller sees it too -- it is their own identity), and logged by the
/// proxy as `$upstream_http_x_gn4_user`. Without it nginx's access log
/// answers "which address" and never "which user", so "is so-and-so using
/// this successfully" needs guessing from user agents and behaviour -- which
/// is exactly what it took to answer that question on 2026-11-09.
pub const USER_HEADER: &str = "x-gn4-user";

/// Where [`AuthToken`]'s extractor leaves the subject for
/// [`crate::lib::tag_caller`] to put on the response, since the extractor
/// runs inside the handler and the middleware outside it.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct CallerSlot(std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Option<Caller>>>);

/// Who a request ran as, and with which credential. The subject is a
/// gn-auth user id; `id` is the registry handle of an opaque token
/// (`agent-ravanan-3`) and `None` for a JWT. Both go to the access log,
/// because "which person, with which credential" is two different
/// questions -- a shared token and a personal one can carry the same
/// subject, and a token's handle is what `scripts/gn4-log.py` resolves
/// against the registry.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Caller {
    pub scheme: Scheme,
    pub id: Option<String>,
    pub subject: String,
}

impl CallerSlot {
    /// Record the identity of the verified credential.
    pub fn set(&self, scheme: Scheme, id: Option<&str>, subject: &str) {
        if let Ok(mut slot) = self.0.lock() {
            *slot = Some(Caller {
                scheme,
                id: id.map(str::to_string),
                subject: subject.to_string(),
            });
        }
    }

    /// The caller, if a handler got as far as verifying a token.
    pub fn get(&self) -> Option<Caller> {
        self.0.lock().ok().and_then(|slot| slot.clone())
    }
}

/// A verified caller: the token was signed by gn-auth and its
/// standard time claims (exp/nbf, when present -- gn-auth itself
/// treats them as optional, not every token carries them) checked.
/// Does not by itself mean the caller is authorized for anything; see
/// [`authorise`] for that.
/// Which kind of credential a request presented. Downstream code -- the
/// `#[gnauth(secured)]` gate, basket ownership, the access log -- treats
/// both the same way; only the `raw` field's meaning and the places that
/// forward it to gn-auth differ.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Scheme {
    /// A gn-auth JWT: signed, and readable.
    Jwt,
    /// A `gn4ai_` token from this server's own registry: opaque, and
    /// only meaningful here.
    Opaque,
}

impl Scheme {
    /// For the access log and the `who` reply.
    pub fn as_str(&self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Scheme::Jwt => "jwt",
            Scheme::Opaque => "opaque",
        }
    }
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AuthToken {
    /// Which kind of credential this is (see [`Scheme`]).
    pub scheme: Scheme,
    /// The registry id for an opaque token (`zachs-1`), `None` for a JWT.
    pub id: Option<String>,
    /// The token subject (gn-auth user id).
    pub sub: String,
    /// Space-separated OAuth2 scopes, e.g. "profile group resource".
    pub scope: String,
    /// The raw bearer token, forwarded as-is to gn-auth's own
    /// authorization endpoints on the caller's behalf.
    pub raw: String,
}

#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct Claims {
    sub: String,
    #[serde(default)]
    scope: String,
}

impl<S: Send + Sync> FromRequestParts<S> for AuthToken {
    type Rejection = ApiError;

    async fn from_request_parts(parts: &mut Parts, _state: &S) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
        let request = RequestInfo::from_parts(parts);
        let unauthorized = |detail: &str| unauthorized(detail).with_request_id(request.clone());
        let header = parts
            .headers
            .get(axum::http::header::AUTHORIZATION)
            .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
            .ok_or_else(|| unauthorized("Missing Authorization header."))?;
        let token = header
            .strip_prefix("Bearer ")
            .ok_or_else(|| unauthorized("Authorization header must be a Bearer token."))?;

        let config = Config::load();

        // A `gn4ai_` credential never reaches gn-auth: it is opaque, and
        // only this server's registry can say who it is. The prefix check
        // comes first so a short token is never fed to the JWT validator
        // (which would answer with a confusing signature error).
        if token.starts_with(crate::tokens::PREFIX) {
            let registry = crate::tokens::registry(&config.api_tokens_db)
                .map_err(|e| unauthorized(&format!("token registry unavailable: {e}")))?;
            let peer = parts
                .extensions
                .get::<axum::extract::ConnectInfo<std::net::SocketAddr>>()
                .map(|axum::extract::ConnectInfo(address)| address.ip().to_string());
            let record = registry
                .authenticate(token, peer.as_deref())
                .map_err(|e| unauthorized(&format!("token registry error: {e}")))?
                .ok_or_else(|| unauthorized("That token is not valid, has been revoked or has expired."))?;
            if let Some(slot) = parts.extensions.get::<CallerSlot>() {
                slot.set(Scheme::Opaque, Some(&record.id), &record.subject);
            }
            return Ok(AuthToken {
                scheme: Scheme::Opaque,
                id: Some(record.id),
                sub: record.subject,
                scope: record.scope,
                raw: token.to_string(),
            });
        }

        let claims =
            verify(token, &config.auth_server_url).map_err(|e| unauthorized(&e.to_string()))?;
        // For the response header the proxy logs (see `CallerSlot`).
        if let Some(slot) = parts.extensions.get::<CallerSlot>() {
            slot.set(Scheme::Jwt, None, &claims.sub);
        }
        Ok(AuthToken {
            scheme: Scheme::Jwt,
            id: None,
            sub: claims.sub,
            scope: claims.scope,
            raw: token.to_string(),
        })
    }
}

/// Verify `token`'s signature and standard time claims against
/// `auth_server_url`'s JWKS.
fn verify(token: &str, auth_server_url: &str) -> Result<Claims, String> {
    let keys = jwks(auth_server_url)?;
    if keys.is_empty() {
        return Err("gn-auth has no signing keys published yet.".to_string());
    }

    let mut validation = Validation::new(Algorithm::RS256);
    // gn-auth's own resource-server validator treats `exp` as
    // non-essential (not every token carries one), so don't demand it
    // either -- only validate it (below) when a token does have one.
    validation.required_spec_claims.clear();
    validation.validate_exp = true;
    validation.validate_nbf = true;
    validation.set_issuer(&[auth_server_url]);

    let mut last_error = "No signing key matched this token.".to_string();
    for key in &keys {
        match decode::<Claims>(token, key, &validation) {
            Ok(data) => return Ok(data.claims),
            Err(e) => last_error = e.to_string(),
        }
    }
    Err(last_error)
}

/// Above this, a cached JWKS/authorization answer is refetched rather
/// than reused.
const JWKS_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(3600);
const AUTHORISATION_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);

#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct JwksDocument {
    jwks: Vec<Jwk>,
}

#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct Jwk {
    n: String,
    e: String,
}

/// The shared, periodically-refreshed JWKS cache, keyed by
/// auth_server_url (in practice there is only ever one configured,
/// but tests exercise more than one gn-auth instance).
type JwksCache = Mutex<HashMap<String, (Instant, Vec<DecodingKey>)>>;

fn jwks(auth_server_url: &str) -> Result<Vec<DecodingKey>, String> {
    static CACHE: OnceLock<JwksCache> = OnceLock::new();
    let cache = CACHE.get_or_init(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
    let mut guard = cache.lock().unwrap();
    if let Some((fetched_at, keys)) = guard.get(auth_server_url) {
        if fetched_at.elapsed() < JWKS_TTL {
            return Ok(keys.clone());
        }
    }
    let keys = fetch_jwks(auth_server_url)?;
    guard.insert(auth_server_url.to_string(), (Instant::now(), keys.clone()));
    Ok(keys)
}

fn fetch_jwks(auth_server_url: &str) -> Result<Vec<DecodingKey>, String> {
    let url = format!("{}/auth/public-jwks", auth_server_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
    let doc: JwksDocument = ureq::get(&url)
        .call()
        .map_err(|e| format!("fetching {url}: {e}"))?
        .body_mut()
        .read_json()
        .map_err(|e| format!("parsing JWKS from {url}: {e}"))?;
    doc.jwks
        .iter()
        .map(|jwk| {
            DecodingKey::from_rsa_components(&jwk.n, &jwk.e)
                .map_err(|e| format!("invalid JWK: {e}"))
        })
        .collect()
}

/// A dataset older than this is treated as publicly readable
/// regardless of its `public`/`confidentiality` flags.
const PUBLIC_AFTER_YEARS: i64 = 5;

/// Matches GeneNetwork2's own threshold for whether a dataset is
/// readable without authorization (e.g. `ProbeSetFreeze.public > 0 AND
/// ProbeSetFreeze.confidentiality < 1`, used throughout
/// `wqflask/api/router.py`). `InbredSet`/group rows carry a `public`
/// column too, but GeneNetwork2 never actually filters on it -- it's
/// informational only there -- so this only applies to dataset-level
/// (`*Freeze`) rows, which carry both columns.
///
/// Additionally, a dataset older than `PUBLIC_AFTER_YEARS` is treated
/// as public regardless of those flags -- confidentiality embargoes
/// are not meant to last forever. `create_time` is the dataset's
/// `CreateTime` column, as `YYYY-MM-DD ...`; if it can't be parsed,
/// this falls back to the flags alone.
pub fn is_publicly_readable(public: u8, confidentiality: u8, create_time: &str) -> bool {
    (public > 0 && confidentiality < 1) || is_older_than_public_after_years(create_time)
}

fn is_older_than_public_after_years(create_time: &str) -> bool {
    let Some((year, month, day)) = parse_date_prefix(create_time) else {
        return false;
    };
    let created_days = days_from_civil(year, month, day);
    let now_days = match std::time::SystemTime::now().duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH) {
        Ok(since_epoch) => (since_epoch.as_secs() / 86400) as i64,
        Err(_) => return false,
    };
    now_days - created_days >= PUBLIC_AFTER_YEARS * 365
}

/// Parse the `YYYY-MM-DD` prefix of a `CreateTime` value such as
/// `"2015-03-04 00:00:00"`.
fn parse_date_prefix(s: &str) -> Option<(i64, i64, i64)> {
    let mut parts = s.get(0..10)?.split('-');
    let year: i64 = parts.next()?.parse().ok()?;
    let month: i64 = parts.next()?.parse().ok()?;
    let day: i64 = parts.next()?.parse().ok()?;
    Some((year, month, day))
}

/// Days since the Unix epoch (1970-01-01) for a date in the proleptic
/// Gregorian calendar. Howard Hinnant's `days_from_civil`
/// (https://howardhinnant.github.io/date_algorithms.html) -- used here
/// instead of a date/time crate since this is the only place a date
/// needs parsing.
fn days_from_civil(y: i64, m: i64, d: i64) -> i64 {
    let y = if m <= 2 { y - 1 } else { y };
    let era = if y >= 0 { y } else { y - 399 } / 400;
    let yoe = y - era * 400;
    let mp = (m + 9) % 12;
    let doy = (153 * mp + 2) / 5 + d - 1;
    let doe = yoe * 365 + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100 + doy;
    era * 146097 + doe - 719468
}

/// Proof that this request's data was cleared to go out: either it
/// was already [`is_publicly_readable`], or gn-auth's resource-
/// authorization round trip (`authorise_trait`/`authorise_dataset`,
/// via [`check`]) said so. The field is private, so only this module
/// can construct one -- a handler elsewhere can bind or match it
/// (e.g. by having its `Found` variant carry `Authorized` alongside
/// the data) but never fabricate one, which is what makes it an
/// actual guarantee rather than a type-shaped comment. See
/// `gnauth_macros::gnauth`, which checks at compile time that any
/// handler tagged `#[gnauth(secured)]` actually mentions this type.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Authorized(());

/// Check whether `token`'s holder may view data gated by
/// `dataset_name`'s own public/confidentiality/create_time -- either
/// because it's [`is_publicly_readable`], or because gn-auth's
/// resource-authorization round trip says so (per-trait when
/// `trait_name` is `Some`, dataset-wide when `None`, e.g. for a
/// listing). Returns the [`Authorized`] capability on success, so
/// callers can't construct a "found and visible" result without one.
///
/// This is the one place [`is_publicly_readable`] and
/// `authorise_trait`/`authorise_dataset` are combined; every gated
/// handler (src/routes/traits.rs, src/routes/datasets.rs,
/// src/routes/groups.rs) calls this instead of writing that branch
/// out itself.
pub fn check(
    auth_server_url: &str,
    token: &AuthToken,
    dataset_name: &str,
    trait_name: Option<&str>,
    public: u8,
    confidentiality: u8,
    create_time: &str,
) -> Result<Option<Authorized>, String> {
    if is_publicly_readable(public, confidentiality, create_time) {
        return Ok(Some(Authorized(())));
    }
    // A `gn4ai_` token cannot authorise confidential data: gn-auth has
    // never heard of an opaque token, and the alternatives -- minting a
    // gn-auth token on the fly from a stored credential, or keeping a
    // second grant model in step with gn-auth's -- were both rejected for
    // v1 (see the project memory: "API tokens: the one hard edge is
    // gn-auth's resource-authorization round trip"). Say so explicitly,
    // so the caller knows to use a JWT rather than that they lack a
    // privilege.
    if token.scheme == Scheme::Opaque {
        return Err(
            "Short API tokens can only read public data. This resource is not public; \
             use a gn-auth JWT (Authorization: Bearer <jwt>) for confidential datasets."
                .to_string(),
        );
    }
    let authorised = match trait_name {
        Some(trait_name) => authorise_trait(
            auth_server_url,
            token,
            dataset_name,
            trait_name,
            VIEW_RESOURCE_PRIVILEGE,
        )?,
        None => authorise_dataset(
            auth_server_url,
            token,
            dataset_name,
            VIEW_RESOURCE_PRIVILEGE,
        )?,
    };
    Ok(authorised.then_some(Authorized(())))
}

/// Boolean form of [`check`], for callers that filter a list of
/// resources rather than reject a single request with 403 (e.g.
/// publication_traits, which drops traits the caller may not view
/// instead of failing the whole request).
pub fn is_authorised(
    auth_server_url: &str,
    token: &AuthToken,
    dataset_name: &str,
    trait_name: Option<&str>,
    public: u8,
    confidentiality: u8,
    create_time: &str,
) -> Result<bool, String> {
    Ok(check(
        auth_server_url,
        token,
        dataset_name,
        trait_name,
        public,
        confidentiality,
        create_time,
    )?
    .is_some())
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
struct AuthorisationRequest<'a> {
    #[serde(rename = "resource-ids")]
    resource_ids: [&'a str; 1],
}

#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct ResourceAuthorisation {
    #[serde(default)]
    roles: Vec<Role>,
}

#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct Role {
    privileges: Vec<Privilege>,
}

#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct Privilege {
    privilege_id: String,
}

/// Ask gn-auth whether `token`'s holder has `privilege` on
/// `resource_id` (`POST /auth/resource/authorisation`; see
/// docs/gn-auth.md). Cached per (sub, resource_id) for
/// `AUTHORISATION_TTL`, so repeated requests for the same resource by
/// the same user don't each cost a round trip to gn-auth -- the
/// fine-grained caching discussed before building this.
///
/// Only call this for data that is *not* [`is_publicly_readable`];
/// public data needs a valid token (use [`AuthToken`] alone) but no
/// per-resource check.
pub fn authorise(
    auth_server_url: &str,
    token: &AuthToken,
    resource_id: &str,
    privilege: &str,
) -> Result<bool, String> {
    let privileges = resource_privileges(auth_server_url, token, resource_id)?;
    Ok(privileges.iter().any(|p| p == privilege))
}

/// Privileges are cached per (subject, resource), refreshed after
/// PRIV_TTL; the map type is shared by the resource- and trait-level
/// privilege lookups.
type PrivilegesCache = Mutex<HashMap<(String, String), (Instant, Vec<String>)>>;

fn resource_privileges(
    auth_server_url: &str,
    token: &AuthToken,
    resource_id: &str,
) -> Result<Vec<String>, String> {
    static CACHE: OnceLock<PrivilegesCache> = OnceLock::new();
    let cache = CACHE.get_or_init(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
    let key = (token.sub.clone(), resource_id.to_string());

    {
        let guard = cache.lock().unwrap();
        if let Some((fetched_at, privileges)) = guard.get(&key) {
            if fetched_at.elapsed() < AUTHORISATION_TTL {
                return Ok(privileges.clone());
            }
        }
    }

    let privileges = fetch_resource_privileges(auth_server_url, token, resource_id)?;
    cache
        .lock()
        .unwrap()
        .insert(key, (Instant::now(), privileges.clone()));
    Ok(privileges)
}

fn fetch_resource_privileges(
    auth_server_url: &str,
    token: &AuthToken,
    resource_id: &str,
) -> Result<Vec<String>, String> {
    let url = format!(
        "{}/auth/resource/authorisation",
        auth_server_url.trim_end_matches('/')
    );
    let body = AuthorisationRequest {
        resource_ids: [resource_id],
    };
    // Not .send_json(): it sets "Content-Type: application/json;
    // charset=utf-8", but gn-auth's request_json() (gn_auth/auth/
    // requests.py) compares Content-Type for exact equality with
    // "application/json" and silently falls back to query/form
    // params (empty here) on anything else, turning this into a 400
    // instead of the JSON body ever being read.
    let json = serde_json::to_vec(&body).map_err(|e| format!("encoding request body: {e}"))?;
    let mut response: HashMap<String, ResourceAuthorisation> = ureq::post(&url)
        .header("Authorization", &format!("Bearer {}", token.raw))
        .content_type("application/json")
        .send(json.as_slice())
        .map_err(|e| format!("calling {url}: {e}"))?
        .body_mut()
        .read_json()
        .map_err(|e| format!("parsing authorisation response from {url}: {e}"))?;
    Ok(response
        .remove(resource_id)
        .map(|r| {
            r.roles
                .into_iter()
                .flat_map(|role| role.privileges.into_iter().map(|p| p.privilege_id))
                .collect()
        })
        .unwrap_or_default())
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
struct DataAuthorisationRequest<'a> {
    traits: [&'a str; 1],
}

#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct DataAuthorisationResponse {
    #[serde(default)]
    authorisation: Vec<TraitAuthorisation>,
}

#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct TraitAuthorisation {
    #[serde(default)]
    privileges: Vec<String>,
}

/// Ask gn-auth whether `token`'s holder has `privilege` on the trait
/// `dataset_name::trait_name` (`POST /auth/data/authorisation`; see
/// docs/gn-auth.md). This is the dataset/trait-keyed equivalent of
/// [`authorise`], for data addressed by a `(dataset, probeset)` pair
/// rather than a gn-auth resource id directly -- gn-auth resolves the
/// resource itself from the trait's dataset name. Cached per (sub,
/// dataset::trait) for `AUTHORISATION_TTL`, same as [`authorise`].
///
/// Only call this for data that is *not* [`is_publicly_readable`];
/// public data needs a valid token (use [`AuthToken`] alone) but no
/// per-resource check.
pub fn authorise_trait(
    auth_server_url: &str,
    token: &AuthToken,
    dataset_name: &str,
    trait_name: &str,
    privilege: &str,
) -> Result<bool, String> {
    let privileges = trait_privileges(auth_server_url, token, dataset_name, trait_name)?;
    Ok(privileges.iter().any(|p| p == privilege))
}

/// Ask gn-auth whether `token`'s holder has `privilege` on
/// `dataset_name` as a whole -- for listing every trait in a dataset,
/// where there's no single trait to name. gn-auth resolves a trait's
/// resource purely from its dataset name (see docs/gn-auth.md); the
/// trait half of a `"Dataset::Trait"` string never affects which
/// resource, and so which privileges, come back -- this just omits it.
pub fn authorise_dataset(
    auth_server_url: &str,
    token: &AuthToken,
    dataset_name: &str,
    privilege: &str,
) -> Result<bool, String> {
    authorise_trait(auth_server_url, token, dataset_name, "", privilege)
}

fn trait_privileges(
    auth_server_url: &str,
    token: &AuthToken,
    dataset_name: &str,
    trait_name: &str,
) -> Result<Vec<String>, String> {
    static CACHE: OnceLock<PrivilegesCache> = OnceLock::new();
    let cache = CACHE.get_or_init(|| Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
    let key = (token.sub.clone(), format!("{dataset_name}::{trait_name}"));

    {
        let guard = cache.lock().unwrap();
        if let Some((fetched_at, privileges)) = guard.get(&key) {
            if fetched_at.elapsed() < AUTHORISATION_TTL {
                return Ok(privileges.clone());
            }
        }
    }

    let privileges = fetch_trait_privileges(auth_server_url, token, dataset_name, trait_name)?;
    cache
        .lock()
        .unwrap()
        .insert(key, (Instant::now(), privileges.clone()));
    Ok(privileges)
}

fn fetch_trait_privileges(
    auth_server_url: &str,
    token: &AuthToken,
    dataset_name: &str,
    trait_name: &str,
) -> Result<Vec<String>, String> {
    let url = format!(
        "{}/auth/data/authorisation",
        auth_server_url.trim_end_matches('/')
    );
    let trait_fullname = format!("{dataset_name}::{trait_name}");
    let body = DataAuthorisationRequest {
        traits: [&trait_fullname],
    };
    // See fetch_resource_privileges for why this isn't .send_json().
    let json = serde_json::to_vec(&body).map_err(|e| format!("encoding request body: {e}"))?;
    let sent = ureq::post(&url)
        .header("Authorization", &format!("Bearer {}", token.raw))
        .content_type("application/json")
        .send(json.as_slice());
    let mut response = match sent {
        Ok(response) => response,
        // gn-auth answers a trait with no linked resource (i.e. one
        // nobody has ever restricted) with a 404, not an empty
        // privilege list -- treat it the same as "no privileges" here
        // rather than as a request failure.
        Err(ureq::Error::StatusCode(404)) => return Ok(Vec::new()),
        Err(e) => return Err(format!("calling {url}: {e}")),
    };
    let doc: DataAuthorisationResponse = response
        .body_mut()
        .read_json()
        .map_err(|e| format!("parsing authorisation response from {url}: {e}"))?;
    Ok(doc
        .authorisation
        .into_iter()
        .flat_map(|t| t.privileges)
        .collect())
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn is_publicly_readable_matches_genenetwork2_threshold() {
        let recent = "2024-01-01 00:00:00";
        assert!(is_publicly_readable(1, 0, recent));
        assert!(is_publicly_readable(2, 0, recent));
        assert!(!is_publicly_readable(0, 0, recent));
        assert!(!is_publicly_readable(1, 1, recent));
    }

    #[test]
    fn is_publicly_readable_also_true_past_the_embargo_age() {
        assert!(is_publicly_readable(0, 1, "2000-01-01 00:00:00"));
        assert!(!is_publicly_readable(0, 1, "2024-01-01 00:00:00"));
        // Unparseable create_time: fall back to the flags alone.
        assert!(!is_publicly_readable(0, 1, "not-a-date"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn days_from_civil_matches_known_dates() {
        assert_eq!(days_from_civil(1970, 1, 1), 0);
        assert_eq!(days_from_civil(2000, 3, 1), 11017);
        assert_eq!(days_from_civil(1969, 12, 31), -1);
    }
}