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Realigns every pipe-table column to a uniform width, and trims cell
text so each table stays under 100 chars per row, moving one
over-long cell's detail (InbredSet.MappingMethodId) into a footnote
paragraph below its table instead of dropping it. The gn-auth.md
endpoints table is left over 100 chars, with a note explaining why: its
longest path is 66 chars by itself, leaving no room for the other two
columns under that cap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Adds a gnauth-macros proc-macro crate and a private-field Authorized
capability type in src/auth.rs, so #[gnauth(secured)] is a real,
compile-time-checked guarantee that a handler performs the gn-auth
resource-authorisation round trip before sharing trait/probeset
values, rather than just a comment. #[gnauth(token_only)] marks
handlers that require a token but skip the round trip, and
#[gnauth(disabled)] marks the two handlers that need no token at all.
Also fixes groups.rs: group_trait_values, group_trait_info and
group_traits previously performed no gn-auth round trip at all for
published-trait data; they now resolve the group's PublishFreeze row
and call the same auth::check used elsewhere, denying by default when
no such row exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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tied to dev mode.
The endpoint no longer depends on GENENETWORK4_DEV_MODE or on the bind
address. It decides per request whether to answer.
* src/routes/dev.rs (get_test_token): answers a caller only when the TCP
peer (axum ConnectInfo) is in 127.0.x.x (or ::1, or an IPv4-mapped
127.x) and the request carries no X-Forwarded-For, Forwarded or
X-Real-IP header (a reverse proxy on the same host would otherwise make
every client look local). Anything else, including an unknown peer, is a
403. Local is never established from a header.
* src/main.rs: serve with into_make_service_with_connect_info, which
provides the peer address.
* src/config.rs: remove dev_mode, GENENETWORK4_DEV_MODE and
dev_token_enabled(). Add GENENETWORK4_TEST_TOKEN (on by default); when it
is not a clearly affirmative value (true/1/yes/on) the route is not
registered: a 404, absent from /openapi.json. It fails closed, so a
typo ("flase") turns the endpoint off.
* src/lib.rs: register the route unless that switch is off.
* tests: tests/get_test_token.rs rewritten (remote, unknown and proxied
peers refused; 127.x and ::1 answered; always documented by default);
tests/get_test_token_off.rs for the switch (own process: it sets an
environment variable); common::post_from supplies a peer address to the
in-process requests. Python: test_get_test_token.py rewritten, TOKEN_ENV
is now empty (no setting needed).
* README.md, docs/gn-auth.md, docs/SKILL.md, RELEASE_NOTES.md: document
the check, the switch, and "Behind nginx or in a container" (a bridge
container sees the gateway as the peer; a host-network container behind
nginx sees 127.0.0.1, so block the path in nginx, set X-Forwarded-For,
or switch the endpoint off).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Breaking: every success body is now {"data", "meta": {"state",
"took_ms", "request_id"}, "notes", "next"}; clients read `data`. Only
`/` (plain text) and `/openapi.json` are unwrapped.
* src/response.rs (Envelope, Meta, State, Ctx, RequestInfo): handlers
take Ctx first and build the response with ctx.envelope(data), so
timing and the request id are never filled in by hand. `state` is
`complete` or `partial`; notes are server-authored only; `next` are
concrete relative hrefs (path_segment percent-encodes names).
* src/routes/*.rs, src/lib.rs (version): every handler returns
Envelope<..> with next links; /search is `partial` when the locus
lookup fails or a sorted 1000-hit window may be truncated, and
/publications/{pubmed_id}/traits when datasets were left out for
authorization.
* src/error.rs (ApiError): add `took_ms`, an RFC 7807 extension member.
* src/auth.rs (AuthToken): the 401 now carries request_id and took_ms
(it never had a request_id); Ctx stores RequestInfo in the request
extensions for it.
* tests: common::data / envelope_data parse every success body through
the envelope; tests/envelope.rs and test/python/test_envelope.py check
the shape, errors, and that every `next` link resolves;
tests/envelope_partial.rs checks the `partial` search without a
database; tests/openapi.rs fails if a JSON success response is not an
Envelope_* schema.
* README.md, docs/SKILL.md, docs/gn-auth.md, RELEASE_NOTES.md: document
the envelope and took_ms on errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Rename: POST /dev/token -> POST /get-test-token (src/routes/dev.rs,
TestToken replacing DevToken), matching tests/get_test_token.rs and
test/python/test_get_test_token.py (renamed from
tests/dev_token.rs/test_dev_token.py). Config::dev_token_enabled() and
the GN_AUTH_DEV_* config keys keep their names -- they're about the
dev-token feature generically, not tied to this one route's path.
Every endpoint now requires a valid token, not just the
dataset_probeset*/traits* family: species(_by_name/_datasets),
groups(_by_name/_strains/_traits*/_datasets) and dataset_by_name all
gain an AuthToken parameter. /, /version, /openapi.json and
/get-test-token itself are the only exceptions -- a health check, a
version check, the spec describing all this, and the endpoint that
hands out a token in the first place (which would be circular if it
needed one).
Rather than repeating security(("bearer_token" = [])) on every
#[utoipa::path], ApiDoc now declares it once as the document's default
security(...), and the three exceptions besides /get-test-token (/,
/version) override it with their own empty security() -- standard
OpenAPI semantics (an operation's own security, even empty, overrides
the document default; an absent one inherits it). error::Unauthorized,
a new #[derive(utoipa::IntoResponses)] type wrapping ApiError, is the
shared 401 every gated handler now references bare in its own
responses(...) list instead of writing out the same
(status = 401, description = "...", body = ApiError) tuple by hand.
Verified the resolved security per operation in a live /openapi.json.
tests/common::auth_token() (Rust) and the new
test/python/auth_helpers.auth_token() (Python, deduplicating what four
files previously each defined locally) now try this server's own
POST /get-test-token first, falling back to GN4_TEST_AUTH_TOKEN --
every previously-ungated test file gains a token check and switches to
get_with_token; the whole suite, both languages, now runs with zero
manually-provisioned tokens given GENENETWORK4_DEV_MODE=true
GENENETWORK4_BIND=127.0.0.1 for the test run. ServerTestCase gains
EXTRA_ENV so each Python test class can start its own server with dev
mode on. Verified both configured (auto-fetch) and unconfigured
(GN4_TEST_AUTH_TOKEN fallback, and full skip when neither is set, e.g.
the Guix build sandbox) paths.
README.md, docs/gn-auth.md and RELEASE_NOTES.md updated throughout for
the rename and the new blanket token requirement.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XDDpXvZBQat9uSgDeEMJ8d
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Calls gn-auth's own password grant (POST /auth/token) for gn-auth's
well-known development user and returns the result, so local testing
no longer needs a manual curl/gn-auth round trip of its own.
Only ever registered -- not just rejected at request time, genuinely
absent from the router and from /openapi.json -- when two new Config
fields are both set: dev_mode (GENENETWORK4_DEV_MODE) and a loopback
bind (GENENETWORK4_BIND, also new). Both are config, not something
genenetwork4 infers from its actual network exposure, by design: dev
mode alone, or a loopback bind alone, each leave it disabled, and the
check (Config::dev_token_enabled) is a plain function so the condition
itself has direct unit test coverage rather than only being exercised
indirectly through the route.
src/main.rs now binds to config.bind instead of a hardcoded "0.0.0.0",
via a proper SocketAddr rather than string formatting -- the latter
would mishandle an IPv6 bind address like "::1" (needs brackets).
GN_AUTH_DEV_CLIENT_ID/_CLIENT_SECRET/_USERNAME/_PASSWORD default to
gn-auth's own published dev fixtures (flask init-dev-clients,
gn_auth/wsgi.py), so this works unconfigured against an unmodified dev
gn-auth instance -- confirmed live, including using the returned token
against a real gated endpoint (/traits/BXD/10001), not just checking
the token response's shape.
tests/dev_token.rs covers all four combinations of the two settings in
one sequential test function (mutating the same two env vars from more
than one #[tokio::test] in a file would race, since they run
concurrently by default) plus the /openapi.json visibility check.
test/python/test_dev_token.py mirrors this using separate test classes
instead, which is safe here since each spawns its own server
subprocess with its own environment (ServerTestCase gains EXTRA_ENV for
this).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XDDpXvZBQat9uSgDeEMJ8d
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A new, additional endpoint family that addresses both trait categories
the same way -- (dataset, trait) -- matching GeneNetwork2's own generic
wqflask.api.router.trait_sample_data/get_trait_info, rather than the
two category-specific shapes genenetwork4 already has
(/datasets/{dataset}/probesets... and /groups/{group}/traits...), which
are unchanged and keep working exactly as before.
- db::resolve_trait_dataset(name) resolves a dataset name against
ProbeSetFreeze first, then the new db::PublishDataset (a PublishFreeze
row, via the new get_publish_freeze_by_name) -- whichever matches
decides the category. This means only dataset names are ever
"guessed" across categories, not trait names/ids, which is the much
smaller and safer surface: GN2's own equivalent tries ProbeSet.Name
and PublishXRef.Id against the same bare trait string and silently
falls back, which can return the wrong trait on a same-named
collision. get_publish_freeze_by_name accepts a PublishFreeze's own
Name/ShortName/Id or its owning group's Name/InbredSetName/FullName/
Id, mirroring GN2's own flexible matching (e.g. "BXDPublish" or
"BXD").
- GET /traits/{dataset}: list every trait in a dataset, tagged by
category.
- GET /traits/{dataset}/{trait}: one trait's metadata. A non-numeric
trait against a Publish dataset is a 404 (can't match a
PublishXRef.Id), not a 500.
- GET /traits/{dataset}/{trait}/values: that trait's per-strain values.
TraitValue and ProbeSetValue are already identical in shape, so this
unifies with no information loss, unlike the metadata endpoint above.
Metadata responses are a tagged union ({"category": "probeset"|
"publish", ...}) wrapping ProbeSetInfo/TraitInfo unchanged, rather than
a lossy common-fields schema -- the two share little beyond
mean/locus/lrs/additive. utoipa generates this as a oneOf with a
category discriminator, verified against /openapi.json.
Gated the same way as /datasets/{dataset}/probesets..., extended to
Publish data for the first time: /groups/{group}/traits itself is
still not gated, but reaching the same data through /traits/{group}
now requires a token and checks PublishFreeze.public/confidentiality.
No gn-auth-side change was needed -- POST /auth/data/authorisation
already dispatches *Publish-suffixed dataset names to its phenotype
resource resolver (gn_auth/auth/authorisation/data/phenotypes.py),
the exact mechanism this integration already relies on for mRNA data.
auth::VIEW_RESOURCE_PRIVILEGE moves from routes::datasets (private) to
routes::auth (pub) so routes::traits can reuse it instead of
duplicating the string.
tests/traits.rs and its Python mirror cover both categories (including
both ways of addressing a Publish dataset), the 401/403/404 cases, and
the non-numeric-trait-against-Publish-dataset edge case, run against a
real gn-auth instance. The Publish branch's deny path itself is only
exercised via gn-auth's "unlinked dataset" fallback (already proven for
ProbeSet) -- no non-public PublishFreeze exists in the database this
was tested against.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XDDpXvZBQat9uSgDeEMJ8d
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List endpoints for the two trait domains, each the listing equivalent
of an existing singular endpoint:
- GET /groups/{group}/traits: every published (phenotype) trait in a
group (db::get_group_traits), same fields/join as
/groups/{group}/traits/{trait_id}, no token required -- matching its
singular sibling, which isn't gated either. A large group (BXD has
15000+ phenotype traits) can take several seconds and tens of
megabytes to return in full; no pagination yet, matching
GeneNetwork2's own wqflask.api.router.fetch_traits, which has no
default limit either.
- GET /datasets/{dataset}/probesets: every expression (ProbeSet) trait
in a dataset (db::get_dataset_probesets), same fields/join as
/datasets/{dataset}/probesets/{probeset}. Gated the same way as that
singular endpoint -- a valid token is required unconditionally, and
a non-public dataset is checked against gn-auth once for the whole
dataset via a new auth::authorise_dataset, rather than once per
probeset in the list. Leaving this listing ungated would have let a
caller read out a whole non-public dataset's trait data in one
request, bypassing the gate just added to the singular endpoint.
auth::authorise_dataset wraps authorise_trait with an empty trait
name: gn-auth resolves a trait's resource purely from its dataset
name, so the trait half of a "Dataset::Trait" string never affects
which privileges come back. Verified directly against the live
instance both for an unlinked non-public dataset (403, deny) and
folded into dataset_probesets's own test for the public/embargo-aged
bypass path.
tests/group_traits.rs, tests/dataset_probesets.rs and their Python
mirrors cover both, run against a real gn-auth instance for the gated
one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XDDpXvZBQat9uSgDeEMJ8d
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Same treatment as dataset_probeset_info: require a valid AuthToken
unconditionally, and for a dataset that isn't publicly readable, check
group:resource:view-resource via authorise_trait -- denied is a 403,
gn-auth unreachable is a 502.
Unify DatasetProbesetLookup/DatasetProbesetInfoLookup back into one
generic enum (with the new Forbidden variant) now that both
dataset_probeset_info and dataset_probeset_values need it, rather than
keeping two near-identical enums.
tests/dataset_probeset_values.rs and its Python mirror gain the same
401/403 cases as dataset_probeset_info's, run against a real gn-auth
instance; the 403 case reuses UTHSC_BXD_Cochlea_0225, confirmed to
have both ProbeSet metadata and ProbeSetData values rows so the test
exercises the authorization check rather than ProbesetNotFound.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XDDpXvZBQat9uSgDeEMJ8d
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Require a valid gn-auth bearer token on this endpoint unconditionally.
For a dataset that isn't publicly readable, check the
group:resource:view-resource privilege via a new auth::authorise_trait,
the "Dataset::Trait"-keyed equivalent of authorise (POST
/auth/data/authorisation instead of /auth/resource/authorisation) --
gn-auth resolves the resource itself from the dataset name, so no
separate resource-id lookup is needed here. A trait never linked to a
gn-auth resource (gn-auth answers 404) is treated as "no privileges",
not a request failure. Denied requests get a 403; a failure to
reach/parse gn-auth's answer gets a 502, distinct from both that and
this service's own 500s.
is_publicly_readable now also takes the dataset's CreateTime and treats
anything older than 5 years as public regardless of its
public/confidentiality flags -- a confidentiality embargo isn't meant
to last forever. No admin/sysadmin bypass is implemented.
Register a "bearer_token" OpenAPI security scheme (src/lib.rs) so the
new security(...) annotation on this endpoint's #[utoipa::path] has
something to point at.
tests/dataset_probeset_info.rs and its Python mirror gain cases for the
missing-token (401) and denied-but-existing (403) outcomes, run against
a real gn-auth instance set up as described in docs/gn-auth.md; the
403 case uses UTHSC_BXD_Cochlea_0225, a real non-public, non-embargoed
dataset never linked into gn-auth. tests/common gains get_with_token
and auth_server_available/auth_token helpers for this.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XDDpXvZBQat9uSgDeEMJ8d
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* docs/gn-auth.md: Document the GN2 public>0 AND confidentiality<1
threshold (the test for whether data needs a gn-auth authorization
call at all, versus just a valid token), the now-implemented
src/auth.rs mechanism, and the four gn-auth bugs found and fixed while
building it.
* RELEASE_NOTES.md: Likewise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XDDpXvZBQat9uSgDeEMJ8d
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* docs/gn-auth.md: New file. Explains how a client (genenetwork4)
should authenticate callers against gn-auth: tokens are RS256 JWTs,
verified locally via the JWKS at GET /auth/public-jwks (mirroring
genenetwork3's gn3/oauth2/jwks.py, with two improvements -- cache and
periodically refresh the key set instead of refetching per request,
and check exp/nbf/iss, not just the signature); resource-scoped
authorization checks (e.g. "can this token's user do X on InbredSet
Y") via /auth/resource/populations/resource-id/... and
/auth/resource/authorisation, mirroring genenetwork3's
gn3/api/case_attributes.py:required_access. Documents why
POST /auth/introspect should not be used yet (unconfigured client
allow-list, no client ever created with the client_type it requires,
and JWT tokens are never persisted for it to find).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XDDpXvZBQat9uSgDeEMJ8d
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