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| author | Pjotr Prins <pjotr.public01@thebird.nl> | 2026-11-14 14:20:54 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Pjotr Prins <pjotr.public01@thebird.nl> | 2026-11-14 14:20:54 +0000 |
| commit | 586b0f63ef31fde987e00a305e91ee4e2136332e (patch) | |
| tree | 47eea9436d52d4634023b053f99049fa3ff21f39 /test/python/server_test_case.py | |
| parent | c822ba22ce00c1615bf47fc8a13f28590aba424a (diff) | |
| download | genenetwork4-586b0f63ef31fde987e00a305e91ee4e2136332e.tar.gz | |
tokens: short opaque API tokens in a single tokens.sqlite
A second credential format beside gn-auth's JWT, for agents and scripts:
`gn4ai_` + 56 body characters + 2 checksum characters = 64, from an
alphabet with no look-alikes, so a typo is refused before the registry is
consulted. Opaque by design -- nothing is stored in the token; every fact
lives in one SQLite database (`tokens.sqlite`, GN4_API_TOKENS_DB, mode
0600, gitignored) keyed by the SHA-256 of the secret. Revoking is a row,
takes effect on the next request, and a token in a log line reveals
nothing; lose the registry and every short token stops working.
Administration is local-only: GET/POST /tokens, DELETE /tokens/{id} and
GET /tokens/who are behind a router layer that refuses any caller whose
TCP peer is not 127.x.x.x/::1, and any request claiming to come through a
proxy. A layer rather than a per-handler check, so nothing of a remote
request is parsed before it is refused; there is no configuration switch,
because minting credentials must never be reachable from the network.
A short token reads public data only: every token-only endpoint, and
`#[gnauth(secured)]` endpoints for public rows; a confidential dataset is
refused with a 403 that names the JWT route, since gn-auth cannot validate
an opaque token (the on-the-fly-bridge and registry-grant alternatives
were both rejected for v1).
scripts/gn4-token.py create|list|revoke|who drives the routes, so there is
one implementation of the format and the revocation rules; the token is
printed exactly once.
Tests: the localhost guard over all four routes (remote peer, no peer,
proxied header), and mint -> authenticate -> who -> revoke -> 401.
Diffstat (limited to 'test/python/server_test_case.py')
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