1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
|
# Problem With Roles: Privilege Escalation
## Tags
* type: bug
* status: open
* priority: critical
* assigned: fredm, zachs
* keywords: gn-auth, authorisation, authorization, roles, privileges
## Description
The current implementation of `gn2.wqflask.oauth2.roles.create_role(…)` function is broken and can lead to possibly unbounded privilege escalation.
What it currently does is that it fetches all the roles a user has, on all resources, regardless of type and/or ownership, then allows the user to create a role from that. As such, a user with write access to ResourceA and no write access to ResourceB could hypothetically gain write access to ResourceB, by say:
* Create a new throw-away account
* Creating a new role, that includes the write access from ResourceA
* Assign new role to throw-away account on ResourceB
* Do unapproved writes on ResourceB with throw-away account
The implementation should instead, tie the roles to the specific resource, rather than group. This means, then, that the user cannot create a role on any resource that exceeds their access level for that resource — thus no privilege escalation is possible.
### Plan of Action
* [x] Remove the `….create_action` function: raise exception when used
* [x] Remove the "Roles" page on the UI
* [ ] migration: Remove `group:role:[create|delete|edit]-role` privileges from `group-admin` role
* [ ] migration: Add `resource:role:[create|delete|edit]-role` privileges to `resource-owner` role
* [ ] Create a new "Roles" section on the "Resource-View" page, or a separate "Resource-Roles" page to handle the management of that resource's roles
* [ ] Ensure user can only assign roles they have created - maybe?
### Fixes
=> https://github.com/genenetwork/genenetwork2/commit/7d0c5cf8d2ab49f6a98c0a15189da5b7fa1695fd
=> https://github.com/genenetwork/genenetwork2/commit/c1af1940cca1ae54d424632e8c5f06b55cae071a
|
