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# Problem With Roles: Privilege Escalation
## Tags
* type: bug
* status: open
* priority: critical
* assigned: fredm, zachs
* keywords: gn-auth, authorisation, authorization, roles, privileges
## Description
The current implementation of `gn2.wqflask.oauth2.roles.create_role(…)` function is broken and can lead to possibly unbounded privilege escalation.
What it currently does is that it fetches all the roles a user has, on all resources, regardless of type and/or ownership, then allows the user to create a role from that. As such, a user with write access to ResourceA and no write access to ResourceB could hypothetically gain write access to ResourceB, by say:
* Create a new throw-away account
* Creating a new role, that includes the write access from ResourceA
* Assign new role to throw-away account on ResourceB
* Do unapproved writes on ResourceB with throw-away account
The implementation should instead, tie the roles to the specific resource, rather than group. This means, then, that the user cannot create a role on any resource that exceeds their access level for that resource — thus no privilege escalation is possible.
### Plan of Action
* Remove the `….create_action` function: raise exception when used
* Remove the "Roles" page on the UI
* Create a new "Roles" section on the "Resource-View" page, or a separate "Resource-Roles" page to handle the management of that resource's roles
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