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* gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-minimal)[source]: Update to 2.6. Remove 'patches' field. * gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch: Delete files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them. Signed-off-by: Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>wip-deploy
Marius Bakke
6 years ago
committed by
Leo Famulari
Leo Famulari
11 changed files with 2 additions and 519 deletions
@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ |
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From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 |
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
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Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200 |
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Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no |
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PMF in use |
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|
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WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is |
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enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station |
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side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310) |
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|
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
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---
|
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wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++ |
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) |
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|
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diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
|
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index 954de67..7d79499 100644
|
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--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
|
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+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
|
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@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
|
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end = ptr + key_len_total; |
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total); |
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|
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+ if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) {
|
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+ wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO,
|
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+ "WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled");
|
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+ return;
|
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+ }
|
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+
|
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while (ptr + 1 < end) { |
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if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element " |
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@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ |
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From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 |
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
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Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200 |
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Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation |
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|
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All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining |
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room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last |
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fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. |
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The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual |
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buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process |
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termination. (CVE-2015-5314) |
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|
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
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---
|
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src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++--- |
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) |
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|
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diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
|
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index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644
|
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--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
|
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+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
|
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@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
|
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/* |
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* the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set |
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*/ |
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- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
|
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
|
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if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow " |
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"attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)", |
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@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
|
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} |
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wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); |
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data->in_frag_pos += len; |
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+ }
|
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
|
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment", |
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(int) len); |
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return; |
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@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
|
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* buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last) |
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*/ |
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if (data->in_frag_pos) { |
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- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
|
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- data->in_frag_pos += len;
|
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pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); |
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len = data->in_frag_pos; |
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", |
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--
|
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1.9.1 |
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|
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@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ |
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From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 |
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
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Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200 |
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Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation |
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|
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All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining |
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room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last |
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fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. |
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The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual |
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buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process |
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termination. (CVE-2015-5315) |
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|
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
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---
|
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src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++---- |
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) |
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|
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diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
|
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index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644
|
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--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
|
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+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
|
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@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
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/* |
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* buffer and ACK the fragment |
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*/ |
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- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
|
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
|
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data->in_frag_pos += len; |
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if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { |
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack " |
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@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
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return NULL; |
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} |
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wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); |
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-
|
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+ }
|
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
|
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resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, |
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EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE, |
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EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData)); |
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@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
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* we're buffering and this is the last fragment |
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*/ |
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if (data->in_frag_pos) { |
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- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
|
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", |
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(int) len); |
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- data->in_frag_pos += len;
|
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pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); |
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len = data->in_frag_pos; |
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} |
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--
|
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1.9.1 |
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|
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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ |
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From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 |
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
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Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200 |
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Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message |
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|
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If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity |
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exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and |
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data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange() |
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did not take this corner case into account and could end up |
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dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid |
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message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316) |
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|
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
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---
|
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src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++- |
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) |
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|
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diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
|
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index 75ceef1..892b590 100644
|
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--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
|
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+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
|
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@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
|
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wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN); |
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|
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fin: |
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- bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
|
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+ if (data->grp)
|
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+ bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
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BN_clear_free(x); |
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BN_clear_free(y); |
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if (data->outbuf == NULL) { |
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--
|
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1.9.1 |
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|
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@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ |
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From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 |
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From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> |
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Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200 |
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Subject: [PATCH 1/5] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase |
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|
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WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control |
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characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as |
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STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or |
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WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase. |
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|
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This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated |
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the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from |
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an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should |
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such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file |
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could become invalid and fail to be parsed. |
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|
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> |
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---
|
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src/utils/common.c | 12 ++++++++++++ |
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src/utils/common.h | 1 + |
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src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++ |
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3 files changed, 23 insertions(+) |
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|
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diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c
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index 450e2c6..27b7c02 100644
|
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--- a/src/utils/common.c
|
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+++ b/src/utils/common.c
|
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@@ -697,6 +697,18 @@ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len)
|
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} |
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|
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|
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+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
|
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+{
|
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+ size_t i;
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+
|
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+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
|
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+ if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127)
|
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+ return 1;
|
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+ }
|
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+ return 0;
|
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+}
|
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+
|
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+
|
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size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, |
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const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, |
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const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) |
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diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h
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index 701dbb2..a972240 100644
|
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--- a/src/utils/common.h
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+++ b/src/utils/common.h
|
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@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len);
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|
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char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); |
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int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); |
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+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
|
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size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, |
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const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, |
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const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); |
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diff --git a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
|
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index eadb22f..e8c4579 100644
|
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--- a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
|
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+++ b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
|
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@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struct wps_credential *cred)
|
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cred->key_len--; |
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#endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */ |
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} |
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+
|
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+
|
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+ if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) &&
|
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+ (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) {
|
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase");
|
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+ wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key",
|
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+ cred->key, cred->key_len);
|
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+ return -1;
|
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+ }
|
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+
|
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return 0; |
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} |
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|
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--
|
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1.9.1 |
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|
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@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ |
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From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 |
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From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> |
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Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200 |
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Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase |
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character |
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|
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WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control |
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characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase |
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includes an invalid passphrase. |
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|
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This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the |
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configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control |
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interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be |
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accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that |
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an untrusted user has access to a management software component that |
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does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to |
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wpa_supplicant. |
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|
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This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of |
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almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration |
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file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., |
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opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, |
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load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again. |
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This would allow code from that library to be executed under the |
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wpa_supplicant process privileges. |
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|
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> |
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---
|
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wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ |
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) |
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|
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diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
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index b1c7870..fdd9643 100644
|
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--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
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+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
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@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data,
|
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} |
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wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)", |
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(u8 *) value, len); |
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+ if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) {
|
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
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+ "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character",
|
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+ line);
|
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+ return -1;
|
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+ }
|
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if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len && |
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os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) { |
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/* No change to the previously configured value */ |
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--
|
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1.9.1 |
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|
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@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ |
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From 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 |
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From: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com> |
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Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 15:40:19 -0800 |
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Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network |
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output |
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|
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Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the |
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wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block |
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parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have |
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been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control |
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characters in the psk parameter. |
|||
|
|||
Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com> |
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---
|
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src/utils/common.c | 11 +++++++++++ |
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src/utils/common.h | 1 + |
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wpa_supplicant/config.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- |
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3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) |
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|
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diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c
|
|||
index 27b7c02..9856463 100644
|
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--- a/src/utils/common.c
|
|||
+++ b/src/utils/common.c
|
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@@ -709,6 +709,17 @@ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
|
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} |
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|
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|
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+int has_newline(const char *str)
|
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+{
|
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+ while (*str) {
|
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+ if (*str == '\n' || *str == '\r')
|
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+ return 1;
|
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+ str++;
|
|||
+ }
|
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+ return 0;
|
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+}
|
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+
|
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+
|
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size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, |
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const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, |
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const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) |
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diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h
|
|||
index a972240..d19927b 100644
|
|||
--- a/src/utils/common.h
|
|||
+++ b/src/utils/common.h
|
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@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len);
|
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char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); |
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int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); |
|||
int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len); |
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+int has_newline(const char *str);
|
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size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, |
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const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, |
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const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); |
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diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
|||
index fdd9643..eb97cd5 100644
|
|||
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
|||
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
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@@ -2699,8 +2699,19 @@ char * wpa_config_get(struct wpa_ssid *ssid, const char *var)
|
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|
|||
for (i = 0; i < NUM_SSID_FIELDS; i++) { |
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const struct parse_data *field = &ssid_fields[i]; |
|||
- if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0)
|
|||
- return field->writer(field, ssid);
|
|||
+ if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) {
|
|||
+ char *ret = field->writer(field, ssid);
|
|||
+
|
|||
+ if (ret && has_newline(ret)) {
|
|||
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|||
+ "Found newline in value for %s; not returning it",
|
|||
+ var);
|
|||
+ os_free(ret);
|
|||
+ ret = NULL;
|
|||
+ }
|
|||
+
|
|||
+ return ret;
|
|||
+ }
|
|||
} |
|||
|
|||
return NULL; |
|||
--
|
|||
1.9.1 |
|||
|
|||
@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ |
|||
From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 |
|||
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> |
|||
Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300 |
|||
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the |
|||
string values |
|||
|
|||
Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without |
|||
filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value, |
|||
unexpected configuration file data might be written. |
|||
|
|||
This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the |
|||
configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control |
|||
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be |
|||
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that |
|||
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that |
|||
does not validate the credential value before passing it to |
|||
wpa_supplicant. |
|||
|
|||
This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data |
|||
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in |
|||
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, |
|||
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user |
|||
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that |
|||
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. |
|||
|
|||
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> |
|||
---
|
|||
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++- |
|||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) |
|||
|
|||
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
|||
index eb97cd5..69152ef 100644
|
|||
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
|||
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
|||
@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var,
|
|||
|
|||
if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 && |
|||
os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) { |
|||
+ if (has_newline(value))
|
|||
+ return -1;
|
|||
str_clear_free(cred->password); |
|||
cred->password = os_strdup(value); |
|||
cred->ext_password = 1; |
|||
@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var,
|
|||
} |
|||
|
|||
val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len); |
|||
- if (val == NULL) {
|
|||
+ if (val == NULL ||
|
|||
+ (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 &&
|
|||
+ os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
|
|||
+ os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
|
|||
+ has_newline(val))) {
|
|||
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string " |
|||
"value '%s'.", line, var, value); |
|||
+ os_free(val);
|
|||
return -1; |
|||
} |
|||
|
|||
--
|
|||
1.9.1 |
|||
|
|||
@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ |
|||
From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 |
|||
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> |
|||
Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300 |
|||
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the |
|||
string values |
|||
|
|||
Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings |
|||
without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the |
|||
value, unexpected configuration file data might be written. |
|||
|
|||
This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the |
|||
configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control |
|||
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be |
|||
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that |
|||
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that |
|||
does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to |
|||
wpa_supplicant. |
|||
|
|||
This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data |
|||
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in |
|||
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, |
|||
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user |
|||
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that |
|||
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. |
|||
|
|||
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> |
|||
---
|
|||
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ |
|||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) |
|||
|
|||
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
|||
index 69152ef..d9a1603 100644
|
|||
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
|||
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
|||
@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data,
|
|||
return -1; |
|||
} |
|||
|
|||
+ if (has_newline(pos)) {
|
|||
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline",
|
|||
+ line, data->name);
|
|||
+ return -1;
|
|||
+ }
|
|||
+
|
|||
tmp = os_strdup(pos); |
|||
if (tmp == NULL) |
|||
return -1; |
|||
--
|
|||
1.9.1 |
|||
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in new issue