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gnu: Remove nss/fixed.

The merge preceding this commit ignored the nss replacement added in commit
7bc396bf35.  This commit removes the remaining
bits, because the fix is already present in nss@3.52.1.

* gnu/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch: Delete file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Adjust accordingly.
* gnu/packages/nss.scm (nss/fixed): Remove variable.
gn-latest-20200725
Marius Bakke 1 year ago
parent
commit
7cfa1f5e78
No known key found for this signature in database GPG Key ID: A2A06DF2A33A54FA
3 changed files with 0 additions and 147 deletions
  1. +0
    -1
      gnu/local.mk
  2. +0
    -8
      gnu/packages/nss.scm
  3. +0
    -138
      gnu/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch

+ 0
- 1
gnu/local.mk View File

@ -1295,7 +1295,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/ngircd-handle-zombies.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/network-manager-plugin-path.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/nsis-env-passthru.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/nss-increase-test-timeout.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/nss-pkgconfig.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/ntfs-3g-CVE-2019-9755.patch \


+ 0
- 8
gnu/packages/nss.scm View File

@ -191,11 +191,3 @@ applications. Applications built with NSS can support SSL v2 and v3, TLS,
PKCS #5, PKCS #7, PKCS #11, PKCS #12, S/MIME, X.509 v3 certificates, and other
security standards.")
(license license:mpl2.0)))
(define nss/fixed
(package
(inherit nss)
(source (origin
(inherit (package-source nss))
(patches (append (search-patches "nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch")
(origin-patches (package-source nss))))))))

+ 0
- 138
gnu/packages/patches/nss-CVE-2020-12399.patch View File

@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2020-12399 (Timing attack on DSA signature generation: NSS has
shown timing differences when performing DSA signatures, which was
exploitable and could eventually leak private keys.)
Copied from upstream:
<https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/daa823a4a29bcef0fec33a379ec83857429aea2e>
but with "nss/" inserted into the file name to patch.
# HG changeset patch
# User Robert Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com>
# Date 1589907685 0
# Node ID daa823a4a29bcef0fec33a379ec83857429aea2e
# Parent d2cfb4ccdf167e5ea06d2bb5bc39c50f789929c8
Bug 1631576 - Force a fixed length for DSA exponentiation r=pereida,bbrumley
Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D72011
diff --git a/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c b/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
--- a/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
+++ b/nss/lib/freebl/dsa.c
@@ -308,23 +308,24 @@ DSA_NewKeyFromSeed(const PQGParams *para
SECItem seedItem;
seedItem.data = (unsigned char *)seed;
seedItem.len = PQG_GetLength(&params->subPrime);
return dsa_NewKeyExtended(params, &seedItem, privKey);
}
static SECStatus
dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest,
- const unsigned char *kb)
+ const unsigned char *kbytes)
{
mp_int p, q, g; /* PQG parameters */
mp_int x, k; /* private key & pseudo-random integer */
mp_int r, s; /* tuple (r, s) is signature) */
mp_int t; /* holding tmp values */
mp_int ar; /* holding blinding values */
+ mp_digit fuzz; /* blinding multiplier for q */
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
unsigned int dsa_subprime_len, dsa_signature_len, offset;
SECItem localDigest;
unsigned char localDigestData[DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN];
SECItem t2 = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
/* FIPS-compliance dictates that digest is a SHA hash. */
@@ -368,31 +369,46 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&g));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&x));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&k));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&s));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&t));
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&ar));
+
/*
** Convert stored PQG and private key into MPI integers.
*/
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.prime, &p);
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.subPrime, &q);
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.base, &g);
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->privateValue, &x);
- OCTETS_TO_MPINT(kb, &k, dsa_subprime_len);
+ OCTETS_TO_MPINT(kbytes, &k, dsa_subprime_len);
+
+ /* k blinding create a single value that has the high bit set in
+ * the mp_digit*/
+ if (RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(&fuzz, sizeof(mp_digit)) != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ fuzz |= 1ULL << ((sizeof(mp_digit) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - 1));
/*
** FIPS 186-1, Section 5, Step 1
**
** r = (g**k mod p) mod q
*/
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&g, &k, &p, &r)); /* r = g**k mod p */
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&r, &q, &r)); /* r = r mod q */
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul_d(&q, fuzz, &t)); /* t = q*fuzz */
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&k, &t, &t)); /* t = k+q*fuzz */
+ /* length of t is now fixed, bits in k have been blinded */
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&g, &t, &p, &r)); /* r = g**t mod p */
+ /* r is now g**(k+q*fuzz) == g**k mod p */
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&r, &q, &r)); /* r = r mod q */
+
/*
** FIPS 186-1, Section 5, Step 2
**
** s = (k**-1 * (HASH(M) + x*r)) mod q
*/
if (DSA_NewRandom(NULL, &key->params.subPrime, &t2) != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
rv = SECFailure;
@@ -406,25 +422,34 @@ dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECIt
goto cleanup;
}
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(t2, &ar); /* ar <-$ Zq */
SECITEM_FreeItem(&t2, PR_FALSE);
/* Using mp_invmod on k directly would leak bits from k. */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&k, &ar, &k)); /* k = k * ar */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &q, &k)); /* k = k * t mod q */
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, &q, &k)); /* k = k**-1 mod q */
+ /* k is now k*t*ar */
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, &q, &k)); /* k = k**-1 mod q */
+ /* k is now (k*t*ar)**-1 */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &q, &k)); /* k = k * t mod q */
- SECITEM_TO_MPINT(localDigest, &s); /* s = HASH(M) */
+ /* k is now (k*ar)**-1 */
+ SECITEM_TO_MPINT(localDigest, &s); /* s = HASH(M) */
/* To avoid leaking secret bits here the addition is blinded. */
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&x, &ar, &x)); /* x = x * ar */
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&x, &r, &q, &x)); /* x = x * r mod q */
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&x, &ar, &x)); /* x = x * ar */
+ /* x is now x*ar */
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&x, &r, &q, &x)); /* x = x * r mod q */
+ /* x is now x*r*ar */
CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &ar, &q, &t)); /* t = s * ar mod q */
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&t, &x, &s)); /* s = t + x */
- CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &q, &s)); /* s = s * k mod q */
+ /* t is now hash(M)*ar */
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&t, &x, &s)); /* s = t + x */
+ /* s is now (HASH(M)+x*r)*ar */
+ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &q, &s)); /* s = s * k mod q */
+ /* s is now (HASH(M)+x*r)*ar*(k*ar)**-1 = (k**-1)*(HASH(M)+x*r) */
+
/*
** verify r != 0 and s != 0
** mentioned as optional in FIPS 186-1.
*/
if (mp_cmp_z(&r) == 0 || mp_cmp_z(&s) == 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
rv = SECFailure;
goto cleanup;

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