# Release Notes ## Unreleased Found and fixed while standing up a from-scratch gn-auth instance (fresh SQLite database, migrations applied, no prior data) to test a new external client (GeneNetwork4) against the OAuth2 token and resource authorisation endpoints. The first three bugs below only show up on a fresh deployment with no existing JWK/users/sysadmins -- an already-running instance with data from before these fixes will not have hit them. The fourth is independent of deployment age -- any instance, old or new, hits it whenever a client sends a malformed or otherwise invalid bearer token to `/auth/resource/authorisation`. ### Fixed - **`JWTBearerTokenValidator` could reject every token for hours after a fresh start.** Its JWKS key set is cached in memory and only refreshed every `jwt_refresh_frequency_hours` (default 6). On a fresh deployment, no JWK exists until the first token is ever issued (keys are generated lazily, see `jwks.py`), which can happen *after* the validator was already constructed with an empty key set. Every token issued before the next scheduled refresh then failed to validate, even though a usable key existed on disk by the time the token arrived. The validator now also refreshes immediately whenever its cached key set is empty, not only when it is stale. (This fix also corrects a second, smaller issue in the same function: `_last_jwks_update` was never actually updated after a refresh, so once the 6-hour window first elapsed, every later token validation would re-read the JWKS directory from disk.) -- `gn_auth/auth/authentication/oauth2/resource_server.py` - **`flask init-dev-clients` could not actually authenticate its own dev client.** The command stored the dev client's secret (`yadabadaboo`) as plain text, but client secret verification (`OAuth2Client.check_client_secret`) always runs the stored value through the Argon2 verifier, which raised `InvalidHashError` on a non-hash string. Every grant type requiring `client_secret_post` -- i.e. all of them -- failed for the dev client. `create-oauth2-client` already hashed its secret correctly; `init-dev-clients` now does the same. -- `gn_auth/wsgi.py` - **Make `Resource.created_by` mandatory**; Originally, the fix generated by Claude was to allow a `None` for the `created_by` attribute. This was fundamentally wrong, though it was not Claude's fault, since the typing was wrong too. The fix was updating the typing to make `created_by` a mandatory attribute, and adding some notes to the effect that the "GeneNetwork System" resource (and any other existing resources at the point of setup) should be manually updated to have the system-administrator user as their creator. - **`POST /auth/resource/authorisation` crashed on an invalid bearer token instead of degrading to the public-only view.** Its exception handling only set the response for an authlib error of `missing_authorization` (no `Authorization` header at all); a present-but-invalid token raises `invalid_token` instead, which fell through without setting the response variable, raising `UnboundLocalError` (a 500). Any token-related failure now gets the same anonymous/public-only fallback. -- `gn_auth/auth/authorisation/resources/views.py` ### Verified by hand against a fresh instance - `POST /auth/token` (password grant) issues a JWT; `GET /auth/public-jwks` lists the key once one has been generated. - `POST /auth/resource/populations/create` links an InbredSet group to a new `inbredset-group` resource; `GET /auth/resource/populations/resource-id//` resolves it back to the same `resource-id`. - `POST /auth/resource/authorisation` returns the full role/privilege list for the resource's owner, and just `{"public-read": false}` for an anonymous *or* invalid-token caller on a non-public resource -- the cases an external resource server (e.g. GeneNetwork4) needs to distinguish from "authorized". - This is also exercised automatically: GeneNetwork4's `tests/auth.rs` runs its full token-verification and resource-authorization flow (including the caching layer) against a real gn-auth instance. ### Noted, not changed here - The `system-administrator` role's broad `system:*` privileges are special-cased as globally applicable only inside gn-auth's own `@authorised_p`-protected endpoints (`gn_auth/auth/authorisation/checks.py`'s `__system_privileges_in_roles__`). `POST /auth/resource/authorisation` -- the endpoint an external resource server actually calls -- does not use that special case; it reflects only `user_roles` rows tied to the specific resource queried. A sysadmin therefore does not automatically show up with privileges on a resource created after migration `20250729_03` ran (which only granted the role on resources that existed at the time). Worth a decision before any external client relies on "sysadmin" meaning "full access everywhere". *fredm* (on review of this) notes that this code is an artifact of a previous state of affairs that has long been resolved, and thus, this code (especially the `__system_privileges_in_roles__` function) can be removed. This is because at this point, everything (except users), is considered and treated as some form (or other) of a resource.